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In 2015, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) 
reached approximately 30 years of age. We make that claim in the sense that, “The first 
detailed presentation of the RFT idea was in an invited address. . . at the Association for 
Behavior Analysis meeting in Columbus, Ohio in 1985 entitled Verbal behavior, equivalence 
classes, and rules: New definitions, data, and directions” (Hayes, 2001, viii). Thirty years is a 
long time in science and it constitutes quite a professional investment by those who have 
spent most of their careers working on the theory itself. In this context, there may be a 
tendency among those most closely connected with the theory to show some reticence in 
seeking to develop or extend the account, much less alter or transform it in some fundamental 
way. Such resistance is easy to understand as a natural human reaction to protect something in 
which an individual or group has invested so much time and energy. And of course, science is 
quite sensibly a relatively conservative activity, which typically avoids rapid large-scale 
change unless there is strong and compelling empirical evidence to support an alternative 
perspective or view.  
While recognizing the importance of conservatism in the scientific enterprise, both 
basic and applied, we would argue that after more than 30 years it may be time to reflect upon 
the extent to which RFT has developed conceptually and is continuing to do so, especially 
since the first full book-length treatment of the theory (Hayes, et al., 2001), which is itself 
approaching 20 years of age. In so doing, we would hope to build on the strengths of the 
theory and the advances it has allowed behavioral psychology to make in creating a modern, 
functional-analytic approach to human language and cognition (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Hussey, & Luciano, 2016; Dymond & Roche, 2012; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2016a; 2016b). We believe that in focusing on current and future conceptual development, 
both the basic science and its application may benefit (see Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, 
McEnteggart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). Indeed, as we hope will become clear, a large part of 
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the motivation behind focusing upon ongoing conceptual development for RFT is to facilitate 
and enhance the reticulating model of basic and applied science, and practice, that lies at the 
heart of the contextual behavioral science tradition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012; 
Zettle, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Biglan, 2016). We should add, however, that in calling for a 
greater focus on conceptual development in RFT, we are not advocating for an intellectual  
“free-for-all” or “anything goes” approach. Indeed, quite the contrary – as we will make clear 
towards the end of this introduction we believe that it is vitally important that RFT remains a 
monistic, functional-analytic abstractive theory of human language and cognition with its 
roots remaining firmly planted in the Skinnerian tradition from which it originally grew. 
Background to the Current Special Issue 
The basis for the current special issue of the Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 
(JCBS) on conceptual developments in RFT may be traced back to two events. The first of 
these was a “mini-conference” on RFT at Uppsala University, Sweden, and the other was the 
launching of JCBS. Toward the end of that conference, the four editors discussed the idea of 
asking those participants who had presented work at the meeting, and which appeared to 
constitute a conceptual development in RFT, to consider writing an article for the recently 
launched JCBS. The first editor of JCBS, Joseph Ciarrochi, was contacted shortly thereafter 
and he agreed to the idea of a special issue. Of course, that was some years ago now, and what 
might have been considered a conceptual development at that time might seem somewhat 
dated today. Producing a special issue on conceptual developments in RFT has thus proven to 
be something of a moving target. Consequently, some of the authors of the articles that appear 
in the current volume did not attend the meeting in Sweden, but in the interim years they 
produced some work that appeared to constitute a conceptual development in the theory itself 
or that could have substantive conceptual implications. Although trying to hit a moving target 
can be difficult and frustrating, the editors of the current special issue are encouraged by the 
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fact that even as we write this introductory article we are aware of conceptual developments 
that are unfolding, but are not presented here. This, we believe, is a healthy sign for RFT 
because it means that the theory remains a work in progress and as such could continue to be 
a source of inspiration for basic and applied researchers, and for practitioners, for many years 
to come.  
The Articles 
 The first three articles offer examples of conceptual development in RFT itself. The 
first of these, by Hayes and colleagues, considers how RFT could be developed to connect 
more directly with the six interlocking features of modern evolution science: variation, 
selection, retention, context, dimension, and level. The second article, by Barnes-Holmes and 
colleagues, offers a multi-level multi-dimensional framework for analyzing the dynamics of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding. And the third article, by Shane McLoughlin and 
Ian Stewart, provides an experimental analysis of relating relational networks in a manner that 
has received limited attention in previously published studies. 
 The next two articles consider potentially important implications for the ongoing 
conceptual development of RFT. The first of these, by DeHouwer and Hughes, focuses on a 
recent functional-analytic definition of learning as the impact of regularities in the 
environment on behavior, and considers how this definition may be useful in conceptualizing 
learning from the perspective of RFT. The second paper, by Vahey and colleagues, considers 
how research in cognitive neuroscience on habits and fear could potentially influence future 
RFT research in terms of making novel predictions. 
 The following two papers focus on different areas of application that have implications 
for the ongoing conceptual development of RFT itself. The first of these, by Dixon and 
colleagues, presents research that highlights the relevance of RFT to an area that is not 
frequently associated with the theory, that of challenging behaviors in children with autism. 
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The second paper, by Y. Barnes-Holmes and colleagues, presents two clinical case studies, 
the discussion of which highlights the ongoing effort to connect RFT concepts to the therapy 
environment. 
 The final paper, by De Schryver and colleagues, is technical in nature and offers an 
alternative scoring algorithm for the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The 
IRAP was derived directly from RFT, but the scoring algorithm typically employed with the 
procedure (the D-score) is closely linked to “mainstream” psychometric assumptions. The 
alternative measure is probabilistic and semi-parametric, and thus may fit better with ongoing 
development of the IRAP as a measure of relational framing itself. 
The Challenge Going Forward 
 In reflecting upon the eight papers contained in the current special issue, the sheer 
scope and ambition of RFT, as a “grand” theory of human language and cognition, become 
apparent. From linking the theory with modern evolution science (and neuroscience), with the 
treatment of challenging behaviors in children with autism, and with the impact of trauma on 
the “self” in psychotherapy, and even to a new algorithm for measuring the strength of 
relational framing -- the range of issues covered could indeed appear disorienting, at least to 
those not familiar with the theory. Consider also that RFT constitutes a monistic, functional-
analytic abstractive account of human language and cognition, with its roots firmly planted in 
the Skinnerian tradition, which resides some distance from many of the explicit and implicit 
assumptions of mainstream psychological science. And, it is not difficult to appreciate the 
challenges that RFT faces as it continues to develop conceptually.  
In one sense, the most significant challenge that the theory faces, conceptually, is the 
domain upon which it is targeted – human language and cognition. Why do we say that? Well, 
in our view, the evolution of human language and cognition gave rise to dualism. Indeed, in a 
sense they are dualism in that human language and cognition generates the ability to separate 
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our experience of the world into events that are increasingly abstract and disconnected from 
physical “reality.” And one of the most abstract and disconnected separations that emerges is 
between mind and body. From an RFT perspective, human language is largely responsible for 
creating the human experience of a non-physical, incorporeal “space” called the human mind, 
which interacts with our physical bodies, and gives us purpose, reason, understanding, a sense 
of self, and so on. As a naturalistic and monistic theory, however, RFT eschews dualism, 
although it attempts to explain why dualism, as a verbal behavior, emerges with the evolution 
of human language (see Hayes, 1984). This, in our view, is a precarious, or perhaps more 
accurately, perilous position.  
Most of mainstream psychological science embraces, either implicitly or explicitly, 
dualistic thinking, and as such is free to appeal to events, structures and/or processes in the 
mental (non-physical) domain as explanations for observable behaviors. In contrast, RFT 
cannot adopt this strategy, but seeks to explain human language and cognition, and thus 
dualistic thinking itself, without appealing to dualistic concepts. As such, RFT is like a small 
space ship that is attempting to study a massive black hole while remaining just beyond its 
event horizon, thereby not succumbing to its immense gravitational forces and disappearing 
inside dualism itself. To be clear, from an RFT perspective there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with dualism, per se, but it is so common in psychological science it is difficult to see 
what the theory could offer, above and beyond what mainstream psychology already provides, 
if RFT itself surrendered to the gravity well of dualism.1 
                                                          
1 We recognize that dualism, both inside and outside of science, comes in many forms and varieties, a discussion 
of which is beyond the scope of this brief introduction. In any case, such a discussion would not be directly 
relevant to the concern we are raising here. The “threat” of dualism for RFT is not based on a dogmatic rejection 
of an appeal to mental events (i.e., a non-physical reality) but on the extent to which a focus on ill-defined 
mediating processes (whether or not they are seen as occurring inside a mental domain) gradually serves to 
undermine the scientific goals of RFT itself (see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). These goals, prediction-and-
influence with precision, scope and depth, have been articulated many times elsewhere, and in a sense help to 
define RFT as a functional-contextual theory (Hayes, et al., 2001). The problem with postulating mediating 
processes, particularly if they remain ill-defined within the experimental analysis of the behavior of the 
individual, is that they gradually become the primary focus of scientific research. As a result, proving or 
disproving the explanatory power of those processes comes to dominate the field of inquiry, and the scientific 
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In moving forward conceptually, therefore, the ongoing attraction to dualism should 
not be underestimated. In urging caution here, we recognize of course that RFT is not a space 
ship, it is not even an “it.” Rather, it is a label for a complex cluster of scientific behaviors 
that have emerged from the Skinnerian tradition in psychological science. And herein lies the 
danger. Relatively junior RFT researchers experience enormous social pressure to yield to the 
contingencies of reinforcement that emanate from the economics of modern academic life, 
such as the pressure to publish in so called “high-impact” mainstream journals because doing 
so will, it is argued, increase the likelihood of success in obtaining: funding, academic posts, 
tenure, and internal promotion. More senior RFT researchers may be less susceptible to these 
pernicious social contingencies, but RFT itself predicts that verbal organisms are frequently 
influenced by rather abstract consequences that are contacted verbally rather than directly. 
Thus, for example, the senior RFT researcher may be attracted increasingly to the 
“mainstream” (and ipso facto, dualistic thinking) because it seems to promise that a greater or 
more prominent personal legacy will be left behind by a life-time’s work in psychology.  
In moving forward with RFT as a monistic, functional-analytic abstractive account of 
human language and cognition, it is important, in our view, that all new conceptual 
developments are scrutinized carefully to determine the extent to which they may run the risk 
of the theory spinning uncontrollably into the black-hole of dualistic thinking. The short-term 
benefits of doing so may be high for the individual researcher, but disastrous if the over-
arching value of the group of scientists we call RFT researchers is to continue to build a 
genuinely non-dualistic theory of human language and cognition. In this context, therefore, 
we invite the reader to consider the potential impact each of the articles contained in the 
current special issue may have on the “space ship” of RFT. Will the new conceptual 
                                                          
goals of prediction-and-influence, with regard to the behavior of the individual, are likely to get shuffled off 
center stage (see Sidman, 1960). It is in this sense that RFT cannot afford to get sucked into the black hole of 
dualism (broadly defined) because in doing so the very scientific goals that define the theory itself would likely 
be destroyed.       
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developments expressed in each of the articles contribute meaningfully to the ongoing 
analysis of human language and cognition from a functional, naturalistic, and monistic 
perspective, or will they push the RFT ship perilously close towards the event horizon of the 
black hole of dualism? 
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